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Abstract 
People often make use of a spatial “mental time line” to represent events in time. We 
investigated whether the eyes follow such a mental time line during online language 
comprehension of sentences that refer to the past, present, and future. Participants’ eye 
movements were measured on a blank screen while they listened to these sentences. Saccade 
direction revealed that the future is mapped higher up in space than the past. Moreover, fewer 
saccades were made when two events are simultaneously taking place at the present moment 
compared to two events that are happening in different points in time. This is the first 
evidence that oculomotor correlates reflect mental looking along an abstract invisible time 
line during online language comprehension about time. Our results support the idea that 
observing eye movements is likely to “detect” invisible spatial scaffoldings which are 
involved in cognitively processing abstract meaning, even when the abstract meaning lacks 
an explicit spatial correlate. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed. 
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1 Introduction 
 Eyes can be a window into the mind. They for instance reveal insights into the spatio-
temporal characteristics of ongoing cognitive processes, such as language processing or 
mental imagery (e.g., Altmann, 2004; Grant and Spivey, 2003; Hartmann, Martarelli, Mast, 
& Stocker, 2014; Huette, Winter, Matlock, Ardell, & Spivey, 2014; Johansson and 
Johansson, 2014; Spivey and Geng, 2001; Van Gompel, Fischer, Murray, & Hill, 2007). A 
widespread technique for studying online language comprehension with eye movements is 
the so-called visual world paradigm (Carreiras & Clifton, Jr., 2004; Cooper, 1974; Huettig, 
Rommers, & Meyer, 2011; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). In the 
visual world paradigm, participants are looking at a visual scene and at the same time are 
listening to an utterance which relates to the visual scene. This paradigm has revealed that 
language comprehension directly corresponds to the exploration of the visual world. For 
example, participants fixate their eyes on a depicted lion upon hearing part or all of the word 
'lion', or they fixate their eyes on a lion, zebra, and a snake upon hearing the word 'Africa' 
(Cooper, 1974). More recently, the visual world paradigm has also been used to investigate 
eye movements during online language comprehension of dynamic thought. For instance, the 
mental simulation of the speed of an entity going through space (e.g., a lion is ambling vs. 
dashing toward on object) is also reflected in eye movements (Lindsay, Scheepers, & 
Kamide, 2013; Speed & Vigliocco, 2014). Furthermore, eye movements have been found to 
reflect an abstract kind of motion called fictive motion. Fictive motion is the description of a 
static scene with motion words (Talmy, 1996). It has for example been found that the eyes 
inspect the same visual object (e.g., an image of a road) during a fictive motion description 
(e.g., ‘The road goes through the desert’) longer when the road terrain was first described as 
rough (‘The desert is hilly’) as compared to smooth (‘The desert is flat’) (Richardson & 
Matlock, 2007; cf. also Mishra & Singh, 2010).  
 It is also a well-established phenomenon that the spatial properties of absent visual 
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percepts can influence eye movements, i.e., when these percepts are only imagined or 
recalled (e.g., Beech, 1980; Brandt & Stark, 1997; Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; Laeng & 
Teodorescu, 2002; Martarelli & Mast, 2011). In the context of online eye-tracking 
investigations of spoken language comprehension, this phenomenon has been studied by 
using a paradigm that is closely related to the visual world paradigm and is sometimes 
referred to as the blank screen paradigm (Altmann, 2004; Huette et al., 2014; Johansson, 
Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006; Mishra & Singh, 2010; Spivey & Geng, 2001). In this 
paradigm, participants’ eye movements on a blank screen are recorded while they listen to 
content that in principle is perceptible and can thus be mentally projected onto the screen. In 
one of the first studies using this paradigm (Spivey & Geng, 2001; cf. also Richardson & 
Spivey, 2000), it has been shown that listening to a description of the lower floors of a tall 
building, followed by the description of the higher floors, leads to corresponding upward eye 
movements on the blank screen. As Spivey and Geng wrote: "…[the] construction of a 
mental image is almost 'acted out' by the eye movements, and a mental search of internal 
memory is accompanied by an oculomotor search of external space" (p. 235).  
 More recently––––as with the visual world paradigm––––the blank screen paradigm 
has also been used to investigate eye movements during online language comprehension of 
more abstract thought. For instance, in a recent eye-tracking study, Huette and colleagues 
(2014) found that listening to expressions that emphasize the ongoing nature of an action 
(e.g., he was climbing; past progressive) evokes a wider distribution of eye fixations on the 
blank screen than expressions emphasizing the end point of an action (e.g., he climbed; 
simple past). Thus, abstract linguistic differences can entail specific oculomotor behavior.  
 To the best of our knowledge, all language comprehension studies that investigated eye 
movements searched for oculomotor correlates which relate to objects in space (where the 
“object” can either be animate or inanimate). Thus, as mentioned, it has for instance been 
investigated whether eye movements reflect the speed of an object going through space 
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(Lindsay et al., 2013; Speed & Vigliocco, 2014) or if they reflect looking along a static object 
(Richardson & Matlock, 2007). While we in the current study also used sentences that refer 
to objects in space (e.g, “'Now I’m watching TV. Before that I was listening to music”; 
cf. below), we did not investigate spatial correlates of these objects––––but rather focused on 
abstract (non-perceivable) temporal correlates (e.g., of “before”). Thus, we address the 
question whether the abstract concept of time itself is systematically reflected in eye 
movements during language processing. Time is abstract in the sense that the passing of time, 
or the representation of different events in time, has no obvious perceptual correlate (one 
does not see a timeline when processing temporal information). Nevertheless, recent evidence 
has shown that time is processed within invisible spatial scaffoldings. Particularly, the flow 
of time is conceptualized as progressing along a mental time line (Santiago, Lupáñez, Pérez, 
& Funes, 2007; Torralbo, Santiago, & Lupiañez, 2006; Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010; Ulrich et 
al., 2012), in analogy to number magnitudes that are conceptualized as progressing along a 
mental number line (e.g., Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 
2003; Hartmann, Grabherr, & Mast, 2012; Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005; 
Lourenco & Longo, 2010). The question whether the eyes follow such spatial scaffoldings for 
abstract thought has hardly been investigated yet. In one of the few studies addressing this 
issue, it has been shown that the eyes follow a leftward/downward-small and a 
rightward/upward-large spatial-numerical association when speaking out a random sequence 
of numbers (Loetscher, Bockisch, Nicholls, & Brugger, 2010), or partially also during mental 
addition and subtraction (Hartmann, Mast, & Fischer, 2015). With respect to the spatial-
temporal association, we recently showed that the eyes shifted rightward and upward when 
thinking about the future compared to the past (Hartmann et al., 2014). While these studies 
revealed that the eyes follow an abstract mental number line or time line for internally 
generated stimuli (e.g., numbers, future and past thoughts), the present study is to our 
knowledge the first that investigates if the eyes follow an abstract mental-time-line 
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scaffolding during language comprehension.  
 We investigated whether the eyes follow such a mental time line during online 
language comprehension of sentences that refer to the past, present, and future. Sentences 
with before referred to the past, sentences with after to the future, and sentences with same-
time to the present moment (e.g., 'Now I’m watching TV. Before that I was listening to music'; 
'Now I’m watching TV. After that I will be listening to music'; 'Now I’m doing my homework. 
At the same time I’m listening to music').  
 Processing these temporal relations could be spatially reflected in different ways 
through eye movements––––a possibility, which we will now elaborate on in more detail. In 
Western culture the future is ahead and the past behind (Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980b), suggesting that time is mentally construed to flow along a back-to-front time line 
(Hartmann & Mast, 2012; Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2010; Torralbo et al., 2006; Ulrich et al., 
2012), often also referred to as a "sagittal" time line. As a further time-line option in Western 
culture, the past is to one's left and the future to one's right (Bergen & Chan Lau, 2012; 
Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012; Cooperrider & Núñez, 2009; Santiago et al., 2007; Sinha, Sinha, 
Zinken, & Sampaio, 2011; Torralbo et al., 2006; Tversky, Kugelmass, & Winter, 1991; 
Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010). While some other cultures show different time spatialization 
patterns (Bergen & Chan Lau, 2012; Boroditsky, 2001; Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010; Le Guen, 
2012; Le Guen & Pool Balam, 2012; Núñez & Sweetser, 2006; Sinha et al., 2011; Tversky et 
al., 1991), thus far no culture or language has been found where time is not spatialized in a 
systematic way (Stocker, 2014b). The methodological approaches supporting the existence of 
a specifically directed (e.g., behind-to-ahead, left-to-right, etc.) mental time line include: 
linguistic analysis of spoken-language temporal expressions (Clark, 1973; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980b; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Stocker, 2012; Stocker, 2014a), for instance English 
expressions like “Trouble lies ahead” or “The worst of it is behind us”  (Clark, 1973, p. 51); 
linguistic analysis of signed-language temporal expressions (Boyes Braem, 1992; Brennan, 
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1983; Klima & Bellugi, 1979),  for instance signs in British Sign Language (and other sign 
languages) that locate the past just above the right shoulder and the future further ahead from 
this point (Brennan, 1983, p. 12), or signs in British Sign Language in front of the signer’s 
body that spatialize duration as extending from left to right  (Brennan, 1983, p. 19); co-
speech gestural analysis of spoken-language temporal expressions (Casasanto & Jasmin, 
2012; Cooperrider & Núñez, 2009; Núñez, Cooperrider, Doan, & Wassmann, 2012; Le Guen, 
2012), for instance English co-speech gestures that locate the past further behind (or further 
to the left) and the future further ahead (or further to the right) (Casasanto & Jasmin, 2012; 
Cooperrider & Núñez, 2009); analysis of graphic output of temporal order (Bergen & Chan 
Lau, 2012; Boroditsky & Gaby, 2010; Le Guen & Pool Balam, 2012; Sinha et al., 2011; 
Tversky et al., 1991), for instance cards (say, tadpole, froglet, frog) laid out from left to right 
by native American English speakers (Bergen & Chan Lau, 2012); observing or evoking 
body movement along the sagittal axis while processing time (Hartmann & Mast, 2012; 
Miles, Nind, et al., 2010); and using two-alternative-forced-choice temporal classifications 
(e.g., past-left/future-right) paradigms (Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto & Bottini, 2013; 
Hartmann & Mast, 2012; Miles, Betka, Pendry, & Macrae, 2010; Miles, Tan, Noble, 
Lumsden, & Macrae, 2011; Santiago et al., 2007; Torralbo et al., 2006; Ulrich et al., 2012; 
Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010).  
 Given that our participants were from a Western culture (native speakers of German), 
the eyes might follow a sagittal back-to-front or transversal left-to-right mental time line 
while processing language about time. However, while analysis of eye movements on the 
screen can be used for assessing the transversal (left-right) and vertical (up-down) projection 
of temporal progression onto space, it offers no direct method for assessing the sagittal axis. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to mentally project a sagittal axis as extending “into the screen” 
(e.g., Kaschak et al., 2005). Moreover, we know from visual perception that objects lying 
sagittally ahead of an observer are perceived as higher with increasing distance from the 
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observer, even when in physical reality the objects are not higher, but only further away (Ooi, 
Wu, & He, 2001; Yang & Purves, 2003). Thus, if participants were able to mentally project 
the future as extending sagittally out of their body, then the geometrical projection onto 
screen coordinates would lead to future locations higher on the screen than past locations. In 
other words, the mental time line going away from us might be “ahead” and “up” at the same 
time. To test the up/down and left/right predictions, we analyzed vertical and horizontal 
direction of saccades during temporal processing. If ocular processing is influenced by 
spatiotemporal associations, different amounts of horizontal and vertical saccades are 
expected for the processing of the different temporal relations. 
 As a complementary approach to test our hypothesis that we mentally simulate looking 
along the time line during language comprehension about time, we also analyzed the total 
number of saccades and the fixation patterns for each of the given temporal relations. If we 
mentally look along the mental time line, then processing two sequential (temporally 
separated) events (before, after) should lead to more changes in spatial orientation (i.e., 
saccades) than processing two concurrent (temporally non-separated) events (same-time) 
because two temporally separated events would be represented at two distinct locations on 
the time line. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Participants 
 Sixteen right-handed undergraduate students from the University of Bern participated 
in this study for course credit (10 women, mean age: 21.8, range: 19–27 years). The study 
was approved by the local Ethics Committee, and participants gave informed consent prior to 
the study. 
 
2.2 Stimuli 
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 We used sentence pairs where the second sentence referred to the past, present, or 
future. The first sentence described an event that occurs in the present and always started 
with 'now.' The second sentence described an event that either occurs prior to (before), 
subsequent to (after), or simultaneous (same-time) with the first event. We first created an 
initial set of 30 such sentence pairs, 10 for each category (before, after, same-time). 
Sentences were recorded with a hypothesis-blind German speaker in the phonetics laboratory 
of the University of Zurich. To maintain the natural temporal structure of language, the 
duration of the sentences was not changed artificially. The mean length of the sentence pairs 
was 4088 ms, and the mean onset of the word expressing the temporal relation (before, after, 
same-time) was 2335 ms. Given that the word at the same time (“gleichzeitig” in German) is 
slightly longer than the words before (“vorher”) and after (“nachher”), the mean total 
duration of the same-time sentences was slightly longer (307 ms). However, the duration 
between the offset of the temporal-relation word and the end of the sentence did not differ 
between the categories (F < 1). 
 Two sets of stimuli were created in total. One set contained the 30 sentences created 
initially. In the other set, the contents of the before and after sentences were exchanged (e.g., 
'Now I’m watching TV. Before that I was listening to music' was changed to 'Now I’m 
watching TV. After that I will be listening to music'). In addition, the content of the same-time 
sentences were exchanged (e.g., 'Now I’m listening to music. At the same time I’m doing my 
homework' was changed to 'Now I’m doing my homework. At the same time I’m listening to 
music').1 Counterbalancing the contents of the sentences should minimize time-unspecific 
effects. An independent sample (N = 12) rated each two-sentence pair with respect to arousal 
and to how dynamic the content of the sentence pair was perceived on a seven-point Likert 
                                                 
1 Out of the 30 sentences 15 were phrased with the first person singular ('Now I …') and 15 
with the third person singular ('Now he/she …'). Thus, the person perspective was varied in 
the experiment. However, given that we had no hypothesis in relation to this distinction and 
only a limited number of repetitions of this factor, we did not analyze our data with respect to 
the person perspective. 
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scale. No differences between the before, after, and same-time sentences were found (F < 1). 
To disguise the purpose of this study, we used 40 other sentences as distractors (e.g., 'The 
book store is already closed, but the salesman is still there'). 
 
2.3 Eye movement recording 
 Eye movements were recorded using an SMI RED tracking system (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, Teltow, Germany). Data were registered at a sampling rate of 50 Hz, a spatial 
resolution of 0.1°, and a gaze position accuracy of 0.5°. The primary outcome of the eye 
tracking device are fixations, defined by a minimum fixation duration of 80 ms and a 
dispersion of 100 pixels.2 The eye tracker we used does not allow for detecting saccades 
directly (which would be based on velocity criterion and requires a higher sampling rate). 
Nevertheless, to assess the relative change in spatial attention induced by the temporal 
content, our main analyses were based on saccades, determined by subtracting fixations and 
blink events from the original gaze stream using Be-Gaze software (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, Teltow, Germany). The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch screen using 
Experiment Center Software, and eye data were recorded with I-View X Software (both 
developed by SensoMotoric Instruments). 
 
2.4 Procedure 
 Participants were seated in front of the computer screen and asked to carefully listen to 
a set of sentences including 10 before, 10 after, 10 same-time, and 40 distractor sentences 
while looking at an empty (gray) screen (within-subjects design). The 70 sentences/sentence 
pairs were presented via loudspeakers in random order with a delay between the onset of one 
                                                 
2 The algorithm checks the dispersion of consecutive data points in a moving window by 
summing the differences between the points’ maximum and minimum x and y values 
([max(x) – min(x)] + [max(y)-min(y)]). If the sum is below 100 pixels, the window 
represents a fixation and expands until the sum exceeds 100 pixels. The final window is 
registered as a fixation at the centroid of the window points with the given onset time and 
duration. 
 - 10 - 
sentence pair to the onset of the next sentence pair of 6 s. To encourage semantic processing 
of the contents, participants were told that from time to time questions about the content of 
some sentences would be asked. In fact, 10 statements about the content of a previously 
presented sentence appeared on the screen during the experiment. We randomly selected 10 
of the 40 distractor sentences and generated a question for each of these sentences (requiring 
5 true and 5 false responses). These questions always followed the corresponding sentences. 
Moreover, we directed each participant’s attention away from eye movements by means of a 
cover story. Participants were told that this study was about the relationship between pupil 
size and cognitive processes during sentence comprehension. Participants were asked to 
listen carefully to the sentences and if statements about the contents of previously presented 
sentences appeared on the screen, to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether 
the statement was true or false by saying yes or no. They were told that they are free to move 
their eyes, but they should keep looking at the screen. After the experiment and before 
debriefing, participants were asked to guess the hypothesis of this experiment. The responses 
to the statements and guessed hypotheses were noted by the experimenter.  
 
2.5 Data Analysis 
 We were interested in what impact the words expressing the different temporal 
relations (before, after, same-time) had on the direction of saccades (upward vs. downward, 
leftward vs. rightward) and on the total number of saccades (e.g., is the processing of 
different temporal relations correlated with more eye movements?). We analyzed saccades 
that were performed in the time interval between 500 and 3500 ms after the onset of the word 
expressing the temporal relation. This interval was chosen because the duration of the word 
expressing the temporal relation was at least 500 ms and we expected no semantic processing 
of the temporal relation before then, and 3500 ms include the whole sentence in every trial.  
We excluded 72 saccades (2.7%) from the analysis because they were outside the screen. 
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Each saccade was categorized according to its vertical (upward vs. downward) and horizontal 
(leftward vs. rightward) displacement in space. For example, a saccade categorized as upward 
and rightward means that the y-coordinate of the saccade changed in an upward, and the x-
coordinate in a rightward direction from the start to the stop of the saccade (whereby the 
relative magnitudes of the x and y displacement was irrelevant for this classification). We for 
each participant computed the proportion of upward saccades, the proportion of rightward 
saccades, and the sum of saccades over all trials for each temporal category. A proportion of 
upward saccades of 65% for instance means that 65% of all saccades were directed upward, 
and consequently 35% were directed downward. To capture temporal aspects of the impact of 
the word expressing the temporal relation, we computed these values separately for 1 s time 
intervals and created the variable time interval (1 = saccades that were initiated in the time 
window between 500 and 1500 ms after the onset of the critical time word; 2 = saccades 
between 1500 and 2500 ms; 3 = saccades between 2500 and 3500 ms). We illustrate what 
parts of the sentences occur within these time intervals with the following three examples: 
“Now I’m reading a book–––at the same time I’m ruffling a cat; Now I’m watching TV–––
after(wards) I’m listening to music; Now I’m on the boat–––before I was on an island.” The 
parts “I’m ruffling,” “I’m listening,” and “I was on an” are captured by Interval 1. The 
remaining word(s) are captured by Interval 2, and 1s silence is captured by Interval 3. The 
allocation of contents to time intervals was similar across all sentences. 
 Three separate repeated measures ANOVAs with the variables temporal relation 
(before, after, same-time) and interval (1, 2, 3) were computed for the proportion of upward 
saccades, the proportion of rightward saccades, and the total number of saccades. Paired t-
tests were applied for post-hoc tests. For the proportion of upward and rightward saccades, 
we also performed planned comparisons between before and after sentences (using paired t-
tests; uncorrected p-values are reported). 
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3. Results 
 All participants gave correct responses for at least eight out of the 10 statements, 
showing that the sentences were processed on a semantic level. Moreover, no participant 
correctly guessed our hypothesis.  
 For the mean proportion of upward saccades, the ANOVA revealed a trend for 
temporal relation (p = .083). Most importantly, the planned comparison showed that 
significantly more upward saccades were made when listening to after-sentences than when 
listening to before-sentences (56.8% vs. 50.5%; p = .004). The mean proportion of upward 
saccades for each time and interval is presented in Figure 1a. Upward saccades while 
listening to after-sentences were above chance level (56.8%, SD = 6.9%, t(15) = 3.94, p = 
.001), and also same-time sentences differed from chance (54.5%, SD = 7.3%, t(15) = 2.49, p 
= .025), whereas upward saccades while listening to before-sentences turned out to be non-
significantly different from chance level (p = .76). 
 For the proportion of rightward saccades, the ANOVA revealed no significant effects 
(for all p > .245, see Table 1), and the planned comparison confirmed that there was no 
difference between before and after sentences (p = .662). The mean proportion of rightward 
saccades for each time and interval is presented in Figure 1b. Only the proportion of 
rightward saccades for same-time sentences (M = 53.4, SD = 5.2) differed significantly from 
chance, t(15) = 2.59, p = .021. This effect might reflect that there are asymmetries in the 
proportion of rightward saccades even in a “baseline”, suggesting that 50% might not be an 
appropriate reference. We therefore do not interpret this effect further and focus on the 
comparison between the three categories (which is the relevant comparison for the purpose of 
this study). 
 For the total number of saccades, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
interval and a significant interaction between temporal relation and interval (see Table 1). 
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Post-hoc tests revealed that the total number of saccades was higher in Interval 2 (M = 19.4) 
when compared with Interval 1 (M = 17.8, p = .045) and Interval 3 (M = 17.9, p = .016). 
Interestingly, in Interval 3, fewer saccades were made when listening to same-time than when 
listening to before (15.9 vs. 19.4; p = .008) and after sentences (15.9 vs. 18.3; p = .025; see 
Figure 1c). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Results of the Analysis of Variance with the Variables Temporal relation (TR) and 
Interval (I) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Proportion of    Proportion of    Total number  
upward saccades  rightward saccades  of saccades  
  F p  η2p  F p η2p  F p  η2p 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
TR 2.72 .083  .15  0.30 .740 .02  0.86 .433 .05 
I 0.23 .796 .02  0.06 .939 < .01  3.82 .033 .20 
TR x I  0.50 .737 .03  1.40 .245 .09  3.08 .022 .17 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1. Mean proportion of upward (a) and rightward (b) saccades, and mean number of 
saccades (c), during 500–1500 ms (Interval 1), 1500–2500 ms (Interval 2), and 2500–3500 
ms (Interval 3) after onset of the word expressing the temporal relation of the two events 
(before, after, same-time). * p < .05, ** p < .01. Error bars depict 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals. 
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  Our analysis showed that more upward saccades were made when processing future 
(after) than past (before) sentences. To further assess which saccades (e.g., straight upward 
directed saccades or diagonal directed saccades) drove the difference between the before and 
after sentences, we plotted the proportion of each saccade direction for the two conditions for 
the time intervals 2–3 (showing the most pronounced differences, see Figure 1a). The plot 
shows that the differences were mainly driven by saccades which––––besides a vertical 
component––––also had a horizontal component, rather than by saccades which were just 
going straight up. 
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Figure 2. Polar plot of the percentage of saccades in all directions during online processing of 
linguistically expressed time. White areas stand for saccades while processing the past 
(before), black areas for the future (after), and grey areas represent areas of past/future 
overlap.  Fewer fixations were made for same-time relations when compared to before and after 
relations. This suggests that different locations in time were mapped onto different locations 
in space. We further evaluated this hypothesis by analyzing more carefully the fixation 
patterns and the distribution characteristics of the different conditions. Figure 3 (left panel) 
shows the cumulative spatial distribution of fixations on the blank screen in each condition 
during the time intervals 2 and 3. Dark regions were attended more frequently, and the most 
attended regions are marked with solid lines. Visual inspection of these graphs reveals no 
obvious differences across conditions. As a more sensitive analysis, the right panel of Figure 
3 shows the cumulative dwell time when the x and y coordinates are z-standardized for each 
trial. The height of the 3D-graphs represents the bivariate kernel density estimation (see 
Huette, Winter, Matlock, & Spivey, 2012 and Huette et al., 2014 for a similar analysis). Thus, 
not moving the eyes during a trial results in high density estimation of a single location, 
whereas moving the eyes during a trial leads to a wider distribution of density estimates and 
consequently to a lower local maxima and a less sharp peak (i.e., lower kurtosis) of the 
density estimation function. Interestingly, the same-time temporal relation shows the highest 
maximal density value (0.53, compared to 0.37 for before and 0.39 for after temporal 
relations). Similarly, cumulative kurtosis along the y axis was highest in the same-time 
temporal relation (11.08, compared to 6.33 for before and 8.35 for after temporal relations). 
These results indicate that participants looked more often at the same position when 
processing events taking place at the same time than when events take place at different 
points in time. However, cumulative kurtosis along the x axis was similar across all 
conditions, and two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests along the x and y axis revealed no 
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statistically significant difference between the three distributions (all ps > 0.05). 
 
 
 
 
Same-time 
 
 
Before 
 
 
After 
 - 18 - 
 
Figure 3. The left panel shows the cumulative distribution of fixations on the blank screen 
after the onset of the temporal relation words same-time, before, and after (for the time 
intervals 2 and 3). Dark regions were more attended, and the most attended regions are 
circled with solid lines. The right panel shows the cumulative dwell time on the blank screen 
when the x and y positions are z-standardized for each trial. Fixating the same location during 
a trial results in a high peak of the density function; this is most pronounced for same-time 
relations.   
 
4. Discussion  
 In this study we investigated whether the processing of different temporal relations in 
language (before, after, same-time) is systematically reflected in eye movements (i.e., eye 
movements that are not triggered in response to a perceptual event) on a blank screen. We 
found that significantly more upward saccades were made when processing after (future) 
than before (past) sentences. We interpret this finding in favor of our hypothesis that 
temporal processing evokes eye movements along the mental time line. As we mentally 
represent time, our mind’s eye follows an upward––––and possibly forward––––progressing 
mental time line, and this is reflected in corresponding oculomotor correlates. To date, no 
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evidence in any language or culture has been found for an exclusively upward-progressing 
mental time line (Bender & Beller, 2014, p. 374). In contrast, there is evidence for an upward 
and forward progressing mental time line in a number of spoken and signed languages 
(Boyes Braem, 1992; Brien, 1992; Klima & Bellugi, 1979; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a). Based 
on the paradigm we used in this study we were not able to measure the ocular depth 
dimension directly.3 Thus, we cannot conclude whether we identified eye movements along a 
vertical only or a vertical-sagittal mental time line. But in either case, our findings provide 
the first evidence that eye movements systematically reflect mental looking through time 
during language comprehension about time. The results suggest that the semantic processing 
of temporal relations is supported by the oculomotor system, structuring time in a 
metaphorically congruent manner into space. 
 The finding of a larger number of total saccades when processing before/after temporal 
relations than when processing same-time temporal relations lends additional support to our 
hypothesis that we mentally look along the mental time line. When processing two events 
occurring simultaneously, participants did not map them onto different spatial locations to the 
                                                 
3 There could be one way how our paradigm could detect sagittal mental projection into the 
screen. From binocular visual perception we know that our eyes converge more as they look 
at an object that is within proximal distance and diverge more as they look at an object that is 
more distally removed. This binocular phenomenon is commonly referred to as vergence. 
Thus, if the eyes mentally project more ("further") into the screen while processing the future, 
this could be reflected in a larger vergence angle for processing the future, as compared to the 
past. To investigate this possibility, we measured vergence for before (past) and after (future) 
relations. Vergence was assessed by computing the difference between the horizontal pupil 
position of the left and right eye for each sample in the raw data output. Since pupil position 
data were noisy during blinks and saccades, we only computed vergence during fixations. As 
we were only interested in possible vergence differences between the conditions that 
eventually developed from the onset of the critical time word, a baseline value was subtracted 
from each vergence value. Baseline was the individual vergence before the onset of the 
critical time word (assessed from averaging 5 samples before the onset). We first performed 
the same ANOVA as we performed for the proportion of saccades in our main analysis. This 
analysis revealed no significant vergence effects for before (past) versus after (future) 
relations (all ps > .153). We do not want to over-interpret this null finding because vergence 
typically occurs when the observer looks at an object that is either proximally or distally 
ahead of her or him (e.g., Alvarez, Semmlow, & Pedrono, 2005). Such varying stimulus 
location was not given in our paradigm, as the looked-upon stimulus (the empty screen) 
always remained in one place. 
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same extent as they did when two events occurred at two different points in time. However, 
while the standardized spatial distribution for same-time temporal relation indeed showed the 
highest kurtosis (indicating more fixations at the same position compared to before or after 
relations), the fixation differences were statistically not significant. Interestingly, Huette and 
colleagues (2014) found a much clearer influence of verb form manipulation on the spatial 
distribution of fixations. The weaker influence in our study could be due to the fact that we 
did not manipulate the degree of motion involved when simulating the described action.  This 
then also shows a certain subtleness in our results––––that some of our results are subject to 
certain analytic conditions. Thus, when looking at the mean number of saccades (Fig. 1c), 
then significantly fewer saccades are made when cognitively processing two events that 
happen at the same time, compared to two events that happen at different points in time. 
When looking at cumulative dwell time (Figure 3, right panel), then the eyes fixate more on a 
single point when processing two events that happen at the same time, compared to two 
events that happen at different points. However, with the fixations––––unlike with the 
saccades––––this ocular focus on a single location no longer reaches significance. Thus, it 
remains an open question for future research how exactly the eyes are processing temporal 
simultaneity vs. temporal sequentiality. 
 While we found a difference in the proportion of upward saccades when processing 
future-related compared to past-related sentences, there was no significant difference between 
these two temporal categories and the present (same-time temporal relations). However, the 
proportion of upward saccades for the present was in between the values for future and past, 
suggesting a spatial representation of time of the format past-present-future. Noteworthy, our 
results point to potential asymmetries in this representation: the proportion of upward 
saccades for the present and the proportion of upward saccades for the future were more 
similar when compared to the proportion of upward saccades for the past. Thus it remains 
unclear whether our effect was driven by an increase in upward saccades when processing 
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future, or an increase in downward saccades when processing past-related contents, or both. 
Future studies on the mental time line could also incorporate a baseline in order to further 
assess possible asymmetries in the representation of time. 
 Given the well-established past-left and future-right association in Western culture 
(cf. Introduction), the absence of such an association in the current study is noteworthy. It 
suggests that mentally looking along a transversal left-to-right time line is not an 
indispensable requirement for comprehending and processing temporal information. This 
interpretation is also in line with the finding that the left-to-right mental time line is not 
automatically activated when processing temporal language (Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010; 
Flumini & Santiago, 2013). Our results support the recent claim that language-
comprehension tasks which do not require participants to make explicit temporal judgments 
only allow for using metaphor-driven mappings of concepts onto space (e.g., the future-front 
and future-up metaphors) (Sell & Kaschak, 2011; Sell & Kaschak, 2012). In contrast, tasks 
which require participants to make temporal judgments are more flexible in the use of space 
and, depending on the spatial reference imposed upon by the task settings, allow for 
compatibility effects that are not driven by metaphors, such as the past-left and future-right 
association (Sell & Kaschak, 2011; Sell & Kaschak, 2012; cf. also Santiago & Lakens, 
2015).4 
 Interestingly, in another study of ours, which involved mental displacement into the 
personal future and past, we did find a past-left and future-right effect of eye movements––––
                                                 
4 In general, it is still unclear why judgment tasks seem to lead to back/front and left/right 
time effects while no-judgment tasks only show back/front effects. One possibility is that the 
sagittal time axis is the more basic time axis, as it is "going through the body" of the cognizer 
and that the left-right transversal time axis is a more "external time axis", since it can be used 
with or without projecting a self onto this time line (Hartmann et al., 2014; Núñez & 
Cooperrider, 2013; cf. also Stocker, 2012). In case the transversal time line is more external, 
perhaps more cognitive resources (such as actively making a judgment) are needed to 
cognitively activate this time line. A recent study by Elkmeier, Alex-Ruf, Maienborn, and 
Ulrich (2015) has found that the back/front axis is more strongly associated with space than 
the left/right axis. This also speaks for the possibility that the sagittal axis is the more basic 
spatialized time line. 
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or more precisely, a past-left/down and future-right/up effect (Hartmann et al., 2014). While 
participants mentally traveled one year into the past or future in this other study, the temporal 
differences between the events in the current study were much smaller (in the range of one 
day). A larger temporal distance might lead to more pronounced spatio-temporal associations 
(cf. Sell and Kaschak, 2011). Moreover, unlike in this study, our other study required 
participants to explicitly think about the future and the past for one minute. It is possible that 
left/right time effects in eye movements can only be found when participants are explicitly 
asked to create mental images of their past or future and not in small-time-scale (in the range 
of seconds) online language comprehension about time. In relation to this, it is also an 
interesting question what would have happened if we had instructed our participants to 
actively imagine the contents of the sentences (rather than passively listening to them). 
Perhaps an explicit active imagery component might also bring about a left-to-right effect 
even for processing generic (non-episodic) mental time (our temporal relations are one 
example of such generic time) even in a small time-scale context. 
 Another question for future research is whether processing the past could also activate 
the mental backspace (the space behind the body; e.g., Leuthard, Bächtold, & Brugger, 2005; 
Viaud‐Delmon, Brugger, & Landis, 2007). It is possible that the past mental space is not 
only below the future mental space, but is additionally also conceptualized as being behind 
the body (below the future space and in the backspace). Sign languages often seem to project 
the past into the backspace–––they often signify the past with hand movements which are 
directed toward the backspace that is behind their shoulder (e.g., Brennan, 1983; Boyes 
Braem, 1992; Klima & Bellugi, 1979). Thus, while it has been observed that the past can be 
conceptualized in relation to the backspace (signing space), for online language 
comprehension of time this question remains an open question. 
 Considering that the somewhat passive requirements of our paradigm on behalf of the 
participants–––to merely listen to sentences–––still evoked differences in vertical saccade 
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direction, it stands to reason that the mental simulation of looking along an upward (and 
possibly also forward) progressing mental time line is activated automatically when 
cognitively processing time. While, in general, the question if mental simulation can be 
automatic is still a matter of debate (Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Mahon & Caramazza, 
2009), there is at least some strong evidence that mental simulation of perceptual features of 
objects in space might be automatic (see Vukovic & Williams, 2014). However, to date, 
strong support for the automaticity of mental simulation is still lacking in the realm of mental 
time. The transversal (left-right) mental time line has thus far not been found to be activated 
automatically (Ulrich & Maienborn, 2010; Flumini & Santiago, 2013), while studies 
investigating the same question for the sagittal (back-to-front) mental time line yielded 
inconclusive results (Sell & Kaschak, 2011; Torralbo et al., 2006; Ulrich et al., 2012). Sell 
and Kaschak (2011) found such back-front activation during an atemporal discrimination 
task, which gives some evidence for automatic processing; but evidence for automaticity was 
only found for relatively large time shifts between the target events (e.g., mentally projecting 
one month into the past or future had an effect, while mentally projecting one day into the 
past or future did not). In contrast, Ulrich and colleagues found no sagittal effect whatsoever 
for temporal processing within a single sentence, and Torralbo and colleagues only found one 
in a language-production task. However, all language-comprehension findings that to date 
have investigated the automaticity of spatialized time (Sell & Kaschak, 2011; Torralbo et al., 
2006; Ulrich et al., 2012), have investigated body (hand and arm) motion through time and 
not, as we did, gaze direction through time (cf. also Hartmann et al., 2014; Stocker 2014a). It 
is possible that eye movements during the processing of temporal information are a more 
sensitive indicator for automatic spatiotemporal associations than manual responses. Future 
research is needed to address this question and to further clarify the conditions under which 
spatiotemporal frames of references are recruited automatically. 
 An alternative explanation for the oculomotor behavior which we show in this paper is 
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a cohort effect (Marslen-Wilson, 1987). The (prepositional) word-part “vor” of our German 
temporal-adverb stimuli “vorher” does not only have a temporal (before), but also a spatial 
meaning (in front of). Similarly, “nach” of “nachher” does not only have a temporal (after), 
but also a spatial sense (to, as in going to some place). Thus, according to the cohort model, 
up to the moment when only the word-parts “vor” and “nach” were processed, their spatial 
meanings have also been activated as cohort competitors. One could therefore argue that the 
found effects have been driven by the spatial meanings of the cohort competitors. However, 
there is no logical reason why the spatial meaning in front of should be mapped lower in 
space than the spatial meaning to. Moreover, the spatial meaning of “nach” is (as is to in 
English) direction-unspecific, i.e., it can refer to any direction, depending on where the 
referred-to object is located in space. Thus, it is unlikely that such a direction-unspecific 
spatial meaning would yield such systematic direction-specific results as we have found. 
 Bringing the discussion to non-experimental fields of cognitive science, we can note 
that we have provided empirical (oculomotor) support for an assumption which can also be 
found in mathematical memory modeling (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007) and cognitive-
linguistic analysis (Stocker, 2012, 2014a, in press; cf. also Talmy, 2000, pp. 72–76, 86–87): 
for the assumption that we mentally look through time along a time line. Brown and 
colleagues (2007) have introduced a model of memory retrieval they call SIMPLE (scale-
independent memory, perception, and learning), a model which can explain and predict a vast 
amount of (free and serial recall) experimental memory data. This is how the SIMPLE model 
involves memory cognition along a mental time line: 
 
… memory traces can be seen as located and individuated at least partly in terms of their 
position along a temporal continuum receding from the present into the past. This time line is 
logarithmically compressed, such that recent locations are more easily discriminable from 
one another than are more temporally distant locations (p. 541). 
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Thus, SIMPLE assumes more spatial compression for more distant memory items than for 
more recent ones. This means that if, for instance, five memory items (A-B-C-D-E) are 
recalled, the spatial distance on the time line between A and B is assumed to be smaller than 
the one between D and E, despite the fact that all memory items are assumed to have been 
presented with the same time interval between them. As it is assumed in SIMPLE, our current 
findings also suggest that temporal locations are "discriminable" along a mental time line–––
–indeed, we have identified a possible physiological indicator which might be involved in 
discriminating these temporal points on the mental time line: correspondingly directed eye 
movements. Such a result opens up interesting venues for future research which is related to 
the SIMPLE model. In SIMPLE, more recent locations are more easily discriminable than 
certain more distant locations because more recent locations are spatially further apart from 
each other on the time line than more distant locations (which are spatially more 
compressed). This spatial compression for more distant memory items might for instance be 
oculomotorically reflected in smaller saccades between recalling memory item A and B than 
between recalling memory item D and E in a five-item serial recall task (A-B-C-D-E). As we 
in our study examined generic temporal relations (non-personal, non-episodic time), it is also 
worthwhile mentioning that SIMPLE has not only been successfully applied to episodic 
recall, but also to semantic recall, which also involves non-personal time (Kelley, Neath, & 
Surprenant, 2012; Neath, 2010; Neath & Brown, 2006; Neath & Saint-Aubin, 2011). 
 Cognitive-linguistic work on mental time has also worked with the assumption that we 
mentally look along a time line (Stocker, 2012; Stocker, 2014a; Talmy, 2000). Such 
cognitive-linguistic work on time for instance involves testing certain hypotheses about 
linguistically expressed time by systematically contrasting acceptable and non-acceptable 
linguistic statements about time or time-related space. These overlaps between cognitive-
linguistic findings and our current findings might encourage more oculomotor investigations 
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on cognitive-linguistically derived postulates. Besides looking along a mental time line with 
the present moment as a starting point (which is the basic time concept that we have 
investigated in this current study), cognitive-linguistic work has also proposed other concepts 
in relation to mentally looking along a mental time line. To our knowledge, such concepts 
have hitherto not been investigated experimentally. One cognitive-linguistic example is 
mental looking at the time line in relation to two events where no present moment as a 
reference point is involved. This involves a form of temporal cognition called mental time 
watching and it can underlie expressions like “New Year’s follows Christmas” (Stocker, 
2012).  Perhaps future work will also find systematic oculomotor reflections for these further 
cognitive-linguistic proposals of how we mentally look through time. 
 Our results extend a growing body of evidence showing that metaphors found in 
language manifest themselves in behavioral correlates. It has already been shown that eye 
movements follow a mental number line during random number generation (Loetscher et al., 
2010) or partially during mental addition and subtraction (Hartmann et al., 2015) as well as 
along a mental time line during episodic memory and future thinking (Hartmann et al., 2014). 
Such results, as well as the results of the current study, show that the mind’s eye does not 
only have the capacity to follow an outline of an imagined object within a spatial scene, but 
also has the capacity to follow an outline of a mentally invisible structure––––such as the 
mental number or time line. 
 Do eyes that follow such invisible spatial scaffoldings merely play an epiphenomenal 
role, or do they play a functional and facilitatory role in comprehending and processing 
abstract meaning? There is at least one recent study which points to the possibility that a 
spatialized time line might have functional status. Patients with spatial neglect (due to right-
hemisphere lesions) do not only neglect the left side of space, they also have difficulty with 
the retrieval of past events (left side of mental time line in Western and some other cultures) 
and no comparable difficulty with retrieval of future events (right side of mental time line in 
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Western and some other cultures) (Saj, Fuhrman, Vuilleumier, & Boroditsky, 2014). 
Moreover, recent eyewitness memory studies have produced some first strong results that the 
use of a pictorial time line greatly assists in eliciting more specific memories and in greater 
accuracy of temporal sequence (Gosse & Roberts, 2013; Hope, Mullis, & Gabbert, 2013).  
 Another aspect that potentially points toward a functional role of spatializing time is the 
fact that every single culture or language in the world that has thus far been investigated 
shows some form of systematic spatial expression of time (Stocker, 2014b). Time is in many 
cultures indeed often mentally construed as a (more or less straight) line: from the past to the 
future, time has been found to flow from back to front or left to right in Western and many 
other cultures, from right to left in Hebrew and Arabic cultures, from top to bottom in 
Mandarin Chinese, from front to back in Aymara (i.e., the future is in the back and the past in 
the front), and even from east to west in Pormpuraaw, a remote Australian Aboriginal 
community. Time might also be represented in spatially bent ways (Yupno) or as two distinct 
spatial regions that are not linearly connected or as a circle (Yucatec Maya).  
 A promising future approach for investigating whether the functionality of spatialized 
time holds true cross-culturally would be to test “left-side-of-mental-time-line neglect” (in 
people with spatial neglect with right-hemisphere lesions) in Hebrew and Arabic cultures. If 
spatialized time were functional and at the same time showed cross-cultural variation, right-
hemisphere lesions should for instance lead to “past neglect” in Western culture (as 
investigated and found by Saj and colleagues, 2014), but should lead to “future neglect” in 
Hebrew and Arabic culture. 
 More direct investigation of the functionality of eyes looking along the mental time line 
could come from interference studies. One could use manipulation of eye movements in 
space/time-congruent and space/time-incongruent ways. In Western culture, looking up and 
right should facilitate the processing of future, and looking down and left should facilitate the 
processing of past-related information, while the opposite combinations should impair 
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temporal processing. Again, this pattern should be reversed for Hebrew and Arabic cultures. 
 While the functional role of the spatialization of time remains to be determined by 
future studies, we have shown that observing eye movements is likely to “detect” invisible 
spatial scaffoldings which are involved in cognitively processing abstract meaning, even 
when the abstract meaning lacks an explicit spatial correlate. 
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